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Linguistic Apprehension as 
Incidental Sensation in Thomas Aquinas
Daniel D. De Haan
Abstract: In this paper I will delineate the psychological operations and faculties 
required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic psychology. This will 
require first identifying the proper object of linguistic apprehension, which will 
then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties necessary for linguistic 
apprehension. I will argue that the semantic value of any linguistic term is a type 
of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension is a type of incidental 
sensation. Hence, the faculties necessary for the apprehension of any linguistic 
term’s semantic value will be the cogitative power and the intellect. The cogitative 
power, because it is the faculty of particular intentions, and the intellect, because 
it is the faculty of universal intentions.
Thomas Aquinas rarely treats at length philosophical problems on the relationship between thought and language.1 But the very little he does say has generated a large body of literature from his commentators, 
especially due to the last century’s so-called “linguistic-turn.” Most of this literature 
treats such philosophical problems as how we are able to form sentences that express 
our thoughts,2 how terms are able to supposit for things,3 whether thought and 
language have intentionality,4 whether linguistic terms signify thoughts or things,5 
and to what extent thought in itself is a “mental language” or has any “structural” 
parallels to semantics and syntax, i.e., is there some mentalese?6 Within all this lit-
erature, however, I have not been able to find any extended discussion on the role of 
the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) in relation to language and thought.7 Similarly, 
I have not been able to find any sustained treatment that addresses which cognitive 
faculties must be operative for such commonplace achievements as grasping the 
meaning of a friends’ utterance or understanding words on a page.8
In this paper I will attempt to delineate the psychological operations and 
faculties required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic philosophical 
anthropology. This will require first identifying the proper object of linguistic ap-
prehension, which will then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties 
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necessary for linguistic apprehension.9 I will argue that the semantic value of any 
linguistic term is a type of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension 
is a type of incidental sensation. If this is true it entails that the faculties necessary 
for the apprehension of any linguistic term’s semantic value will be the cogitative 
power and the intellect: the cogitative power because it is the faculty of particular 
intentions, and the intellect as the faculty of universal intentions.10 I will note here 
at the beginning that the aims of this paper are primarily philosophical; however, I 
believe that the theses of this paper are not only consistent with the texts of Aquinas, 
but also provide the most plausible exegesis of the relevant Thomistic texts.
I. Linguistic-use Is a Property of the Human Person
Before taking up the central problem I must first distance this paper’s interpreta-
tion of language-use from a number of problems and confusions other interpretations 
seem to have. It is important to note that while I agree with many Thomists who hold 
that language-use seems to be a distinctive feature of human beings, nevertheless I do 
not agree with the common presentation that language-use only reveals something 
significant to us about the intellect. As the extended treatments of Etienne Gilson, 
David Braine, Alasdair MacIntyre11 and many others make clear, if language-use is 
distinctive of man, then it must reveal something about the whole human person, 
i.e., of his rational animality.12
It will be the contention of this paper that we cannot develop an adequate 
Thomistic account of the psychology of language-use without accounting for the 
linguistic functions performed by the inner senses, especially the cogitative power. 
Unfortunately, many interpretations tend to exaggerate the role of the intellect in 
language-use, which has resulted in a kind of bifurcation that is altogether foreign 
to Thomistic psychology.13 This dualism is found in interpretations that segregate 
language-use to the intellect, which in turn entails that the sense faculties and their 
operations become irrelevant to what is internal to language-use, namely, semantics. 
Two difficulties emerge from this position, and I believe we can better understand 
them both if we look to the origins of this interpretation.
The source of this problem seems to rests in a misinterpretation of what exactly 
constitutes language-use by human persons as rational animals.14 As is well known, 
Thomas Aquinas held that rationality, which is seated in man’s intellect,15 is the 
principle that differentiates man from other animals;16 and since many philosophers 
today tend to identify language-use as the preeminent manifestation of this principle 
of rationality, the natural inference seems to be that we should place language-use 
solely within the domain of man’s highest faculty, viz., the intellect.17 Despite the 
popularity of this position the facts of language and a number of texts in Aquinas 
force us—both philosophically and exegetically—to think otherwise. To begin with, 
language-use cannot be a feature of the intellect alone for the simple reason that 
language necessarily consists in a material component. Now the intellect, according to 
Thomas Aquinas, is immaterial,18 and this is because its proper object is a universal, 
immaterial intelligibility—which specifies its per se operations and consequently the 
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ontological character of the power itself.19 So even though this intelligibility is an 
abstracted quiddity found within material things,20 as intellectually understood, it 
exists as an immaterial intentional being.
No one doubts that such universals are inextricable to the many predications 
used in forming sentences; it is quite clear that without universals man would be 
unable to have language. However, a word, i.e., a linguistic term, is not itself a 
strictly immaterial being like a universal conceived by the intellect. All linguistic 
terms are written or spoken publically or imaged privately—like, for instance, when 
I subvocalize or speak to myself. In other words, all linguistic terms must be in part 
a kind of visible, audible, or tactile sensible. Indeed, Aristotle tells us as much, he 
says that: “Voice is a certain sound of an animate being.” And, “A noun is a vocal 
sound which is significant by convention.”21 Clearly these sensible media, whether 
spoken or written, are neither universal nor strictly immaterial. Considering these 
facts alone it is difficult to understand why so many Thomists are inclined to say 
something so very Cartesian. As putative as it might be to some philosophers that 
language-use entails the intellect, and is therefore in some sense immaterial, it should 
be just as obvious that language-use is always cast and expressed within various 
written or spoken sensibles, which are material things.22 These are the facts which 
Gilson calls the “philosophical constants of language.”
Now however problematic this latter difficulty might be, I think a second dif-
ficulty entirely undermines the philosophical plausibility of this line of interpretation. 
As we have mentioned, this position entails a kind of dualism because it attributes 
semantic apprehension exclusively to the intellect, and places the apprehension of 
linguistic expressions as visual, audible, and tactile sensibles entirely on the side 
of sensation. Now if the intellect alone is semantically involved, this entails that 
semantics are intrinsically and exclusively intellectual. But since the intellect is only 
directly concerned with abstracted universals, we are then forced to eliminate from 
semantics all meanings concerned with circumstantial singular things and events 
which are here and now. Hence, all singular or particular meanings become inher-
ently impossible on this account of language-use. Clearly the consequences of this 
thesis are unacceptable, but not only are they philosophically untenable, they are 
completely inconsistent with Aquinas’s own doctrine.
We only need to examine one text from the Summa Theologiae to confirm this 
exegetical point. In Ia.86.1, the first objection presents an argument which denies 
the thesis that our intellect only cognizes universals. The argument is based on the 
fact that we are clearly able to cognize and form the proposition “Socrates is a man.” 
And since the term “Socrates” is singular, the intellect must be able to cognize the 
singular.23 Aquinas’s reply to this objection is assimilated into the body of the article’s 
response; however, we need not consider his whole response since the most pertinent 
part for our purposes comes at the very end of the body.
Contrary to the objection, Aquinas maintains the thesis that the intellect only 
directly cognizes the universal, but adds the qualification that the intellect can in-
directly cognize the singular in the phantasm. And it is in this indirect way that we 
are able to form the proposition “Socrates is a man.”24 But what does Aquinas mean 
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here when he says that it is through cognition of the singular as by a phantasm that 
we are able to form a proposition with the singular term “Socrates” as its subject? 
Aquinas’s reply to the second objection will provide us with a more complete answer 
to this question.
The second objection is similar to the first in that it tries to establish that 
the intellect does cognizes singulars because we do in fact form propositions with 
singular terms. The argument notes that the practical intellect is ordered towards 
action, and since action is singular, the intellect must therefore be able to cognize 
the singular. Aquinas contends that a singular conclusion cannot be drawn from a 
universal proposition without the medium of a singular proposition. But the lat-
ter, he qualifies, can only be formed by a particular apprehension. This particular 
apprehension is an operation which he attributes to the sensitive part of man. He 
then cites Aristotle’s de Anima III. 11, in support of his answer.25
I believe Aquinas’s two responses reveal that the objectors have made the 
same mistake which we considered before, namely, that of equating semantics use 
exclusively with the intellect and so making all meaning a proper object of the intel-
lect. My interpretation to the contrary hinges in part on what Aquinas means by 
phantasms and the particular apprehension of the sensitive part.
According to Aquinas, following Avicenna and Averroes, phantasms are the 
particular cognitive items formed by the higher internal senses,26 i.e., by the internal 
sensorium, in contrast to the external sensorium, which does not form phantasms. 
The external sensorium includes the five external senses along with the common 
sense faculty (sensus communis). The internal sensorium, for Aquinas, includes the 
imagination, the cogitative power and memory.27 So which of the faculties of the 
internal sensorium does Aquinas have in mind when he makes reference to the 
phantasms that make possible our ability to form propositions with singular terms?
I think it is quite clear that when the propositional term “Socrates” is formed, 
we are not dealing with some kind of image formed by the imagination. One does 
not form an eidetic image or picture in their imagination for the subject of the 
proposition, and then form in their intellect the concept “man” for the predicate. The 
composition of the latter elements could only produce some sort of chimerical half-
image half-conceptual proposition. As bizarre as that mental item sounds, I believe 
this is one of two positions entailed by the dualist interpretation introduced above.
Since the imagination has been eliminated as a viable option, it remains for 
us to discern whether the phantasms that are formed to serve as singular terms in 
propositions are formed in the memory or the cogitative power. Aside from the fact 
that the proper object of memory, viz., the intention of pastness, is irrelevant to at 
least the term “Socrates,” the memory is itself identified by Aquinas as the retentive 
faculty of the cogitative power’s apprehension.28 So we are left with the cogitative 
power as the only viable faculty to fulfill this role.
When Aquinas states in his reply to the second objection that the singular 
proposition is formed by the particular apprehension of a faculty found in the sensi-
tive part of the soul, we should understand this as a clear reference to the cogitative 
power. But if there was any doubt in the matter, Aquinas makes this connection 
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explicit in his commentary on the de Anima passage, which was cited in his reply to 
the second objection, and also in such parallel passages as the commentary on the 
Sentences IV, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, On Truth 10.5 and the commentary on Nicomachean 
Ethics VI. lt. 1, 7, and 9.29
This is significant because it also reveals that Aquinas’s account of practical 
reason requires that there be an inner sense faculty, which he refers to as the “cogi-
tative faculty,” that is able to form singular terms and propositions. More germane 
to our own concerns is that it reveals that semantic notions are not restricted to 
the intellect alone but are also to be found in the cogitative faculty’s formation of 
singular terms and propositions.
II. Three Senses of Verbum in Aquinas
Now that we have sufficiently cleared away a number of mistaken interpreta-
tions about the intellect’s exclusive claim to semantic apprehension and expression, 
we can proceed to the primary aim of this paper. This task has been made easier now 
that I have eliminated a predominant misinterpretation and confusion surrounding 
the problem of linguistic apprehension and its concomitant counterpart in linguistic 
expression. In the next section I will attempt to make clear what the proper object 
of linguistic apprehension is.
It will be instructive to begin with an examination of what Aquinas has to say 
about words before we attempt to formulate our own account of the proper object 
of linguistic apprehension. Aquinas treats of the different senses of the term “word” 
(verbum) in a number of texts; overall his analysis consistently identifies three proper 
senses of verbum.30
1. Word of the Heart (verbum cordis)31
2. Interior Word; image of voice the likeness of the vocal word (verbum interius; 
verbum . . . quod habet imaginem vocis verbum speciei vocis)
3. Vocal Word (verbum vocis)
The “word of the heart” is also often identified by Aquinas as the concept, ratio, or 
intention formed by the intellect.32 It is the term of the intellect’s operation and is 
described as that by which (quo) and as that in which (in quo) the extramental thing 
(res quae sunt extra animam) is understood.33 The “interior word” is described as 
being an image of the “vocal word.” This is the word or audible image, formed by 
the imagination when we speak to ourselves; it is “the interior language, or interior 
word, that Thomas holds as the model according to which we think aloud.”34
Finally, there is the “vocal word” which is spoken out loud in ordinary mean-
ingful human utterances. This “vocal word,” as well as the “interior word” of the 
imagination, signifies the concepts or words of the intellect, through which we grasp 
things.35 In addition to this threefold distinction of verbum, we should also note 
that in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione Aquinas remarks that words 
have three modes of existence, one in the conceptions of the intellect, another in 
vocal utterances, and a third as written.36
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Based on these texts we can see that Aquinas has distinguished four different 
kinds of words; that each word is proper to a different cognitive faculty; and that 
there is a hierarchy or proper order amongst these words. The “word of the heart” 
is proper to the intellect; the “interior word” is proper to the imagination; the “vo-
cal word” is proper to voice for expression37 but, in part, to the auditory faculty for 
apprehension; and the “written word” is proper to vision (or tactility, in the case 
of Braille).
Concerning the hierarchy of words, the “word of the heart” is the primary 
instance of verbum, which all other senses of verbum signify. It is this sense of 
verbum that is intrinsically meaningful in its intentional content, and is therefore 
necessarily required as the principle by which all other verbum are able to carry any 
semantic value.38 Also, the “word of the heart” is the only sense of verbum that is 
properly used in theological discussions concerning the nature of God.39 The other 
senses of verbum can only be used metaphorically in God-talk; this is because, as 
Aquinas notes, the “word of the heart” is the only sense that consists in the intellect 
alone.40 That is to say, the other senses of verbum are all intrinsically are bound up 
with matter (as image, sound, written, and hic et nunc) and cannot properly signify 
the immaterial perfections of the transcendent deity.41
It is these latter derivative senses of verbum that will be the focus of the re-
mainder of this paper. The word as spoken (publically or privately in images) and as 
written is what I shall call a “linguistic term.” A “linguistic term” is any conventional 
sound (e.g., phonemes), visible symbol (e.g., graphemes), or tactile patterns (e.g., 
Braille) that, by human convention and use, contains or is imbedded with a semantic 
value.42 Thematized hylomorphically, a linguistic term consists of a formal compo-
nent, viz., a semantic value, and a material component, viz., some sensible media.43
III. The Proper Object of Linguistic Apprehension
This account of linguistic terms is sufficient to provide us with at least a 
quasi-proper object. Thus far we have established that the proper object of linguistic 
apprehension is a linguistic term, which is a material sensible informed by a semantic 
value. One should recognize immediately that there are a number of problems with 
this quasi-proper object of language. But it is these very difficulties which I believe 
illuminate for us a salient feature of language, which has been recognized by not a 
few philosophers and linguists. Gilson quotes one linguist who nicely captures for 
us the precise difficulty there is in attempting to ascribe to language a single proper 
object, operation, and faculty.
“Physiologically, speech is an overlaid function, or to be more precise, 
a group of overlaid functions. It gets what service it can out of organs 
and functions, nervous and muscular, that have come into being and are 
maintained for very different ends than its own.” The appropriate function 
of teeth is to masticate, that of the palate is to taste; yet language super-
imposes on their natural functions that of contributing to the articulation 
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of speech. One could truly say that a transcendent power “uses” the body 
for ends of a transcendent order akin to itself.44
This is not only true of language’s ability to use organs and psychological faculties for 
its own ends, but of sensible media as well.45 Language is able to “enrich” sensibles, 
i.e., material qualities which are natively semantic-less, with a fecundity of meaning.46
It is for this reason that there cannot be a proper object, operation, or faculty 
for the psychological apprehension and expression of language. Herein also resides 
the root of the confusion had by those philosophers that mistakenly place linguistic-
use, notably semantic apprehension, entirely within the domain of the intellect. 
Language-use is a polyvalent ability that utilizes in concert material things, organs, 
and faculties, i.e., realities which have their own proper ends, and it uses all of them 
for its own linguistic ends. In other words, what we will have to look for is not a 
single proper object, operation and cognitive faculty, but a polymorphic object 
that is apprehended by the concurrent operations of various faculties for a synergic 
linguistic end, which is not to say a sui generis end. This also means that various 
faculties might have in common that their proper objects are often found in and 
through the apprehension of linguistic terms.
We are now in a position to begin delineating the operations and faculties 
necessary for linguistic apprehension. Since all cognition begins with the senses47 
we must begin our account of linguistic apprehension by explicating the sensible 
characteristics of linguistic terms before we can treat of their semantic values.
IV. Linguistic-terms as Essential and Incidental Sensibles
Aquinas’s paradigmatic division of sensibles is threefold.48 There are two kinds 
of sensibles which are sensed essentially (per se) and a third kind that is only said to 
be sensed accidentally (per accidens). The two sensibles that are sensed essentially 
are divided into the proper and common sensibles. Proper sensibles are uniquely 
sensed by a single external sense faculty, and are therefore proper to it alone. Com-
mon sensibles are essentially sensed, but are not exclusively apprehended by any one 
external sense faculty; rather they are able to be cognized by a number of different 
external senses.49 For example, motion is sensed by vision, auditory, and tactile 
powers, hence, motion is a common sensible. Color, on the other hand, is not ap-
prehended by any other sense faculty, and is therefore proper to vision alone.50 Lists 
of proper sensibles typically include color, sound, odor, flavor, and tactile qualities 
(like thermals, textures, density, rarity, etc.). Aquinas’s examples of common sensibles 
often include number, motion/rest, dimension, and shape.51
The proper sensibles common to most linguistic terms would be colors, sounds, 
and tactile sensibles, which are the proper objects of vision, auditory, and tactile facul-
ties. We should not fail to note that each of these linguistic terms’ proper sensible is 
also going to be inextricably constituted by some common sensible, like dimension, 
shape or number. Nevertheless, what is relevant to this paper are proper sensibles for 
they are able to specify distinct cognitive operations and faculties, whereas common 
sensibles by definition do not.
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There should be nothing surprising in this analysis of the putative fact that 
linguistic terms are in part some kind of sensible, most likely a visible, audible, or a 
tactile quality. It seems that it is only overlooked because these sensibles are not the 
most salient aspect of our unified cognition of linguistic meaning as apprehended in 
conversation, reading, and writing. In other words, even though these sensibles provide 
the media that make linguistic communication possible, nevertheless, our conscious 
orientation is directed to the semantic value of linguistic terms and not to their 
distinctive characteristics as sensibles. This latter insight brings us to our next point.
Strictly speaking, sensibles are meaningless, which raises the question: how 
are we able to perform the ubiquitous operations of linguistic apprehension and 
expression through sensation if sensibles are in themselves entirely meaningless, 
and hence without any essential semantic value of themselves? Clearly linguistic 
apprehension is concurrent with sensation, but sensibles as such are devoid of any 
semantic value. What is it in material realities that admit of a semantic value and 
how is this apprehended through sensation?
V. Linguistic-terms as Incidental Sensibles
In order to answer these questions we will have to examine a third kind of 
sensible, namely, incidental sensibles. Aquinas gives us two conditions for something 
to be classified as an incidental sensibles. First, an incidental sensible must be acci-
dentally connected with an essential sensible. For example, this man might be white, 
that dog might stink, this frying pan might be hot, and that moving object is alive. 
There is nothing intrinsic to sensibles like white, stinky odors, or heat that they be 
connected with cognoscible realities like man, dog, frying pan, or living concrete 
particulars. But it is the case that in these instances such cognoscibles are connected 
to these sensibles as concurrent with these sensations, and are thus incidental sen-
sibles. The second condition is that the incidental sensible must be apprehended by 
the same cognitive agent that is sensing. Without this condition there would be no 
reason for saying that some cognoscible is also sensed incidentally.52
A key feature of incidental sensibles, strictly speaking, is that no external sense 
faculty can cognitively apprehend incidental sensibles. In other words, the external 
senses are unable to cognitively receive incidental sensibles, which is not to say 
that such sensibles are not received by the external senses at all. Aquinas makes 
this qualification to preclude a potential ambiguity in the term incidental sensible. 
Without this qualification, one could regard a sweet flavor as an incidental sensible 
to a colored red thing. To clarify the proper extension of the term Thomas qualifies 
that while in a broader sense it is true that redness is incidental to any flavor qua 
flavor, nevertheless, the salient feature of being an incidental sensible in the strict 
sense is that they are not per se sensed by any external sense faculty at all. Hence, 
even though red and sweet are incidental to each other, both color and flavor are 
per se sensibles in their own right.53
What the notion of incidental sensible reveals is that there are other cognos-
cible features of things in reality that are simultaneously apprehended through the 
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essential sensibles of external sensation, but are not themselves apprehended by any 
external sense faculty. But if incidental sensibles are not cognized by any external 
sense faculty, are they cognized by some internal sense or are they apprehended by 
some non-sensory cognitive faculty? Further, and more importantly, what are these 
incidental sensibles essentially in themselves?
Answering the latter question first will provide us with a proper object for the 
former. Aquinas tells us that these incidental sensibles are in themselves essentially 
cognoscible realities, even though they are by definition accidental to sensibles qua 
sensibles. Following Avicenna, Aquinas calls these cognoscible realities intentions, 
as distinct from sensibles or sensible forms.54 Cognoscibles like this man and man, 
Socrates, this beast and beast, this tree and tree, and living are all different instances 
of cognoscible intentions found in reality that are not sensibles apprehended by 
the external senses.55 These cognoscible intentions also admit of a further division 
between those that are of the singular and particular circumstances and those that 
are abstracted from the here and now and are universal. It is this latter division 
between particular and universal intentions that Aquinas employs to specify two 
different faculties necessary for their apprehension. Aquinas asserts that universal 
intentions are apprehended and formed by the intellect, whose proper object is 
universal cognoscibles. The particular intentions are apprehended and formed 
by man’s inner sense faculty, which, as we said above, Aquinas calls the cogitative 
power (vis cogitativa),56 passive intellect (intellectus passivus),57 or particular reason 
(ratio particularis),58 and these particular intentions are the proper object of the 
cogitative power.59
VI. Summation
At this point it will be instructive to draw together and synthesize what this 
paper’s three distinct lines of inquiry have revealed. At the beginning of this paper it 
was shown both philosophically and exegetically that semantic apprehension is not 
exclusive to the intellect, because there are putative instances of singular meanings 
that are apprehended and formed by the cogitative. Our explication of the different 
senses of verbum within Aquinas clarified the reason for the intentional primacy 
of the “word of the heart” over all other senses of verbum. In addition, this latter 
analysis from the second part provided the third part with a philosophically ten-
able quasi-proper object of linguistic apprehension, what I have called a “linguistic 
term.” This third analysis revealed that linguistic terms are a polymorphous object 
composed of a formal semantic component and a material sensible component. In 
seeking to understand how these polymorphous linguistic terms can be apprehended 
psychologically, it has been helpful to analyze them in light of Aquinas’s threefold 
division of proper, common, and incidental sensibles. Finally, our consideration of 
incidental sensibles has brought us back to the proper objects of the intellect and 
cogitative, namely, universal and particular intentions, respectively. This latter point 
has only shown further evidence that semantic values are not inherently intellectual, 
but are also grasped by the cogitative, which is a sense faculty.
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VII. Concluding Remarks: 
The Verbum Cogitativae and Linguistic Apprehension as Incidental Sensation
In light of the foregoing it should be clear that the singular and universal seman-
tic values from the first section map nicely onto what, in the context of incidental 
sensation, Aquinas calls universal and particular intentions. Perhaps for the sake of 
clarity we should make the qualification that intentions should only be considered 
to have a semantic value if they are linguistically apprehended or expressed.60 But 
where does the verbum cordis, that is, the “word of the heart” fit within this picture? 
I think a complete analysis of the Thomistic texts reveals that the verbum cordis is 
synonymous with the intellect’s formation of universal intentions or concepts and 
universal propositions. What is different now, however, is that we have discovered 
another type of intention that is not strictly universal; a type of intention and singular 
semantic value that is grasped and formed in the cogitative, not the intellect. What 
relationship do these cogitative particular intentions and singular propositions have 
to the verbum cordis? Although I do not have time to argue for this here, I would 
suggest that we recognize another analogical and derivative sense of the verbum 
cordis that also applies beyond the intellect to the particular intentions formed by 
the cogitative, that is, a verbum cogitativae like the verbum vocis.61
Before concluding, one final point must be made concerning the particular 
and universal intentions apprehended by the cogitative and intellect. The apprehen-
sion of these intentions can only be designated as incidental sensation of incidental 
sensibles when these intentions are cognized by the cogitative or intellect simul-
taneously with acts of sensation of some one or more external senses.62 But in the 
case of our apprehension of linguistic terms it seems there is always a simultaneous 
apprehension of a material and formal component. Hence, if semantic values are 
never apprehended independently of some material component, e.g., some sound 
or visual character, then linguistic terms are always apprehended as incidental sen-
sibles. And it seems to me that if this is not globally the case, it is at least normative 
to linguistic apprehension.
In sum, I believe that this paper has sufficiently clarified a number of points 
about language-use and shown that, within a Thomistic psychology, semantics is 
not a matter which is exclusive to the intellect, that the cogitative plays an essential 
role in forming meaningful singular propositions, and finally, that it is philosophi-
cally necessary and fruitful to treat linguistic apprehension as a kind of incidental 
sensation.
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A previous version of this paper was presented at the Center for Thomistic Studies 
Colloquium Series, at the University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas; the comments that 
I received during that talk and at the ACPA conference were very helpful. I would like to 
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on the vis cogitativa in Thomas Aquinas. This paper would not have been possible without 
his insightful work on the Angelic Doctor.
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 3. Gyula Klima, “The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Meta-
physics of Being,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 87–141 (henceforth: “Semantic 
Principles of Aquinas”).
 4. Anthony Kenny “Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein” in Thomas Aquinas: 
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives ed. Brian Davies (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 243–256; David Braine, Human Person, 345–479; From Analytical 
Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue, ed. Craig Paterson and Matthew S. Pugh (Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, 2006), see: Stephen Boulter, “Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts” chapter 4, 
59–78; Anthony Lisska, “Medieval Theories of Intentionality: from Aquinas to Brentano and 
Beyond” in chapter 8, 147–170; and John C. Cahalan “Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytic 
Thomism” in chapter 10, 195–214.
 5. John Haldane “The Life of Signs,” The Review of Metaphysics 47.3 (1994): 451–470. 
John O’Callaghan, “The Problem of Language and Mental Representation,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 50.3 (1997); Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form 
of Existence (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); Bernard Lonergan, 
Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David Burrell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1967) (henceforth: Verbum), 151–153; Harm Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal 
God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will, Thomas Instituut 
Utrecht, 4 (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 1996), chapter 5: “Psychology: Human Tensed Way 
of Knowing,” 184–212 (henceforth “Tensed Way of Knowing”); Stephen Boulter, “Aquinas 
and Searle on Singular Thoughts”; Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy; Braine, Human Person, 
X–XII, 345–479; and Klima, “Semantic Principles of Aquinas.”
 6. Robert Pasnau, “Aquinas on Thought’s Linguistic Nature” The Monist: Analytical 
Thomism 80.4 (1997): 558–557; Haldane, “Life of Signs”; Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy; 
Braine, Human Person X–XII, 345–479 (esp. 440–445); Lonergan, Verbum.
 7. Braine and Goris are exceptions. Both of their accounts, however, are more focused 
on the imagination and only mention the cogitative power in passing. Nevertheless, I have 
learned a lot from both of their extensive treatments of language and Thomistic psychology, 
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know of only three dissertations written in English on the cogitative power. But there is noth-
ing substantial said about language and psychology in any of these works. Cf. Mark Barker, 
The Cogitative Power: Objects and Terminology, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Houston, 
University of ST, Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies, 2007; George P. Klubertanz, The 
Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas 
(St. Louis, Mo.: Modern Schoolman, 1952); Leo A. White, The Experience of Individual 
Objects in Aquinas, Diss. CUA, 1997 (Ann Arbor: UMI [Microforms], 1997. Other treat-
ments of the cogitative power also omit any direct account of its function with regard to 
language. Cf. Rudolph Allers, “The vis Cogitativa and Evaluation,” The New Scholasticism 
15 (1941): 195–221; Allers, “The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars,” The Thomist 3.1 
(January 1941), 95–163; Deborah Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms 
and Latin Transformations,” Topoi 19 (2000): 59–75 (henceforth, “Imagination and Estima-
tion”); John Deely, “Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation,” The Thomist 35.1 (1971): 
43–93; Cornelio Fabro, “Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology,” 
New Scholasticism 12 (1938): 337–365; T. V. Flynn, “The Cogitative Power,” The Thomist 16 
(1953): 542–563; George P. Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular,” 
New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 135–166; Anthony Lisska, “A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: 
A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical 
Association 80 (2006): 1–19; Julien Peghaire, “A Forgotten Sense, The Cogitative According 
to St. Thomas Aquinas (part I),” The Modern Schoolman 20 (1943): 123–140; Peghaire, “A 
Forgotten Sense, The Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas (part II),” The Modern 
Schoolman 20, (1943): 210–229; Robert Schmidt S.J. “Unifying Sense, Which?” The New 
Scholasticism 57.1 (1983): 1–21; Michael Stock, O.P. “Sense Consciousness According to 
St. Thomas,” The Thomist 21 (1958): 415–486; Leo A. White, “The Picture Theory of the 
Phantasm,” Tópicos: revista de Filosofía 29 (2005) (Ejemplar dedicado a: Los comentadores 
árabes y latinos de Aristóteles):131–156; “Why the Cogitative Power?” Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 72 (1998): 213–227.
 8. David Braine in his Human Person presents the most extended treatment I have read. 
Other exceptions are Gilson and Kenny who make some remarks on this problem. Gilson, 
however, does not specify faculties, and Kenny develops his own doctrine of the imagination 
and fancy, which fails to properly articulate the points which will be the focus of this essay.
 9. This contention assumes the Platonic-Aristotelian principle of faculty of differentia-
tion (PoFD); a principle I cannot defend within this paper. Cf. Plato, Republic, V 477c–477e; 
Aristotle, de Anima, I, 1 403a1–20; II, 4. 415a18–21; Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent. d. 
27.2.4.1ad3; In DA I. lt. 1; II. 4. lt. 6; III. lt. 8 n. 711; ST I. 77. 3; I-II.23.1; DQdA13. For 
Aquinas’s Avicennian innovations and developments on the PoFD, see DV 15. 1 and 2.
 10. Cf. DV 10.5; 15.1; In DA II. 6. Lt. 13.
 11. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues, The Paul Carus Lectures (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2001).
 12. Although it would require a lengthy treatment of its own, it seems to me that 
linguistic-use is not an aspect of human being’s specific difference, but rather is, like risibility, 
a property of being a rational animal.
 13. Notable examples of this interpretation that I believe are guilty of this bifurcation 
are: Herbert McCabe, On Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies (London and New York: Continuum, 
2008); and Pasnau, “Aquinas on Thought’s Linguistic Nature,” esp. n24; Pasnau, “The Turn 
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Toward Phantasms,” in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature A Philosophical Study of Summa 
Theologiae, 1a 75–89 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.4. 
cf. 272, 284–295, (esp. 293–294); and Boulter, “Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts.” 
Anthony Kenny’s numerous but brief treatments on the topic are difficult to distill. At times 
he seems to make language exclusive to the intellect, however, he also notes the importance of 
placing thought into a sensory context. Further, he does recognize the role of the imagination 
in forming mental images when we are “speaking to ourselves,” and hence, that phantasms, 
in Aquinas, are not pictures but very often are words or inner utterances of the imagination. 
Nevertheless, the latter exercises of the imagination never carry any semantic value for Kenny. 
Finally, his entire account of language use is primarily introduced and treated in his chapters 
and discussions on the intellect. (cf. Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 47–57, 93–99, and 
esp. 112–113; Metaphysics of Mind, 123–139.) We should also note that Kenny’s treatment of 
the cogitative power is marginal at best, and he often attributes operations that are specific to 
the cogitative power to either the imagination or the intellect. Whatever his precise position 
is on the latter, he certainly has omitted what is the crucial thesis of this paper, namely, that 
linguistic apprehension is a kind of incidental sensation. For a sampling of some of Kenny’s 
more extended treatments of these problems see: Anthony Kenny, “Intellect and Imagina-
tion in Aquinas” in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (London and 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1969; Repr. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1976), 274–296. cf. 291–296, Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 36–40, 47–57, esp. 93–99 and 
111–117; The Metaphysics of Mind, 20–26, 110–139, and 156–158; “Intentionality: Aquinas 
and Wittgenstein,” 249–256.
 14. Notable exceptions are David Braine and Alasdair MacInytre, who thematically 
reiterate similar points throughout their work on language and human persons. See also the 
work of Etienne Gilson and John O’Callahan.
 15. Cf. DV 24.3ad1; ST I. 79.10.ad2. It is crucial to make this distinction between 
rationality and the intellect properly speaking, because the failure to do so often results in 
the kinds of confusions I have indicated. Lonergan also stresses the importance of this point. 
“Now, just as human intellect is mainly reason, because it operates from sense as a starting-
point, so the quiddity known by the human intellect is different in kind from that known 
by the angelic” Verbum, 32. “[T]he pure Thomist theory of intellect is to be sought in the 
Thomist account of angelic knowledge, and from that account J. Peghaire rightly begins his 
investigation of Thomist notions of intellect and reason” ibid., 33.
 16. Cf. ST I. 77.3.
 17. “There is, then, a very close relationship between thought and words, between the 
operation of the intellect and the use of language. But it is important not to overstate this 
relationship. Aquinas believed that any judgment which can be made can be expressed by 
a sentence ([DV] 2,4). It does not follow from this, nor does Aquinas maintain, that every 
judgment which is made is put into words, either publically or in the privacy of the imagina-
tion. . . . The understanding of simples is related to the entertaining of judgments as the use 
of individual words is related to the construction of sentences,” Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 
49–50. Kenny’s account is far subtler then this quote reveals, however, it is still instructive 
of his general account of linguistic-use. Linguistic-use does require the inner senses, because, 
as Kenny asserts, the imagination must provide a sensory-context for reference; nevertheless, 
semantic apprehension, even of singular terms, is exclusive to the intellect.
 18. Cf. DQdA 1; ST. I. 75.2
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 19. Cf. DQdA 1; ST. I. 85. 3. See the excellent article, Carlos Bazán, “The Human Soul: 
Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas’ Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism” AHDLMA 64 
(1997): 95–126.
 20. Cf. ST I. 84. 7
 21. Aristotle, de Anima II. 8, 420b8 (trans. Apostle) and De Interpretatione, I. 2. 16a20, 
(trans. Apostle)
 22. Braine writes, “Indeed, in the inseparability of sentence and sense, we come upon 
the most extreme example of the unity of mind and body in an action, here not just the 
unity of intention and act in intentional action but the unity of understanding and speech in 
‘understandingly speaking.’ And in ‘understandingly hearing’ we have the most unmistakable 
and rich example of the unity of the act of ‘perceiving as’ wherein what is perceived and how 
it is perceived (that is, not the means of perception but as what it is perceived) cannot be 
extricated from one another” Human Person, 352. Gilson writes, “The duality observed by 
the linguists in the words of language is but the reflex of that metaphysical duality of human 
nature and of the paradoxical condition of the human intellect. Man does not think without 
images. He ought therefore to have a body in order to be able to think. But the other animals 
have bodies and images; nevertheless, they do not think as man thinks. Seeing that they do 
not speak, their psychism ought to differ in nature from human psychism” Linguistics and 
Philosophy, 68. Cf. O’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn, 297–298.
 23. ST I. 81. 1, obj. 1: See Aquinas’s more extended treatment of the same problem in 
DV. 10.5.
 24. ST I. 86. 1c. To treat this problem adequately, moreover would actually require a full 
account of how we are able to have intellectual cognition of singulars. I cannot do that here. 
For some of the different treatments of this problem see: Cf. Rudolf Allers, “The Intellectual 
Cognition of Particulars,” The Thomist 3.1 (January 1941): 95–163; George P. Klubertanz, 
“St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular”; Francisco L. Peccorini, “Knowledge of 
the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez and Recent Interpreters,” The Thomist 38 (1974): 606–655; 
Stephen Boulter, “Aquinas and Searle on Singular Thoughts,” 59–78; Calvin G. Normore, 
“The Invention of Singular Thought” in Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and 
the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment ed. Henrik Lagerlund, 
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 5 (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 
2007), chap. 6, 109–128. Another article, while not focused on engaging this problem, but 
nevertheless does so with erudition and brevity, is Klima, “Semantic Principles of Aquinas.”
 25. ST I. 86.1, obj 2. ST I. 86.1, ad 2. For Aquinas’s comments on this passage from 
the de Anima see: infra n29.
 26. 26. SCG II. 73. p. 173 (cf. Leonine, 1961. n. 14): “. . . sed a virtutibus in quibus 
sunt phantasmata, scilicet imaginativa, memorativa et cogitativa . . . .” Cf. ST I. 89.5; In 
Mem. III. 15.215-16.226; 16.274-275.
 27. Cf. ST I. 78.4; DQdA. 13. I have taken this distinction between the external and 
internal sensorium from Anthony Lisska, who is the earliest writer I have come across to 
make this distinction. However, when I asked him if it was of his coinage he replied that he 
was not sure of its origins, but suspected that he got it from somewhere else. Cf. Anthony 
Lisska, “Thomas Aquinas on Phantasia: Rooted in But Transcending Aristotle’s De Anima” 
in Aquinas’ Sources, ed. Timothy Smith (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine Press, 2001) n27: 
“One needs here to distinguish the external senses from the internal senses, and the external 
sensorium from the internal sensorium. The former pair is distinguished by the location of 
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the sense faculties, while the latter pair is distinguished by the intentional act itself. The fac-
ulties of the internal sensorium—imagination, the vis cogitativa and the sense memory—all 
require phantasms.”
 28. ST I. 78. 4.
 29. In DA III. 10 (434a16) 251.128–133. Also, DV 10.5, 309.94–99: Both in his 
commentary on this de Anima text and in de Veritate, Aquinas divides practical reason into 
“universal reason” and “particular reason,” which is one of many ways in which Aquinas 
distinguishes the intellect from the cogitative power. Cf. DV 10.5 ad 2, 309.106–110. In 
Ethics VI. lt. 1, n. 1123; lt. 7 nn. 1213–1215; lt. 9, nn. 1247, 1249, 1253, 1255, and 1256. 
Compare these latter passages with ST II-II. 49. 2 and 5.
 30. DV 4.1, 120.192–207. Aquinas makes the same distinctions in In Sent. I. d. 27. 2. 
1, and in ST I. 34.1.
 31. In Sent. I. d. 27. 2. 1.
 32. Cf. De Potentia 8.1 and SCG I. 53. It is important to not confuse the terminus of 
the intellect’s operation with its principle, as so many readers of Aquinas are prone to do. 
Aquinas is very clear on this point; (1) the word of the heart, concept, and intention of the 
intellect are all distinct from (2) the intelligible species, (species intelligibilis) which is the form 
and principle of the intellect’s operation, (3) the intellect itself, and (4) the intellect’s opera-
tion. The word, concept, and intention are all synonyms for the terminus of the intellect’s 
operation. See: Quod. V. 5. 2., which explicitly takes up the question on, “Utrum verbum 
cordis sit species intelligibilis.” Aquinas concludes, “Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, 
quae est principium operationis intellectualis, differat a verbo cordis, quod est per operationem 
intellectus formatum.” For an excellent study on this point see John F. Peifer, The Concept 
of Thomism (New York: The Bookman Associates, 1952). Later reprinted as The Mystery of 
Knowledge (New York: Magi Books, 1964) and again in Modern Writings on Thomism, ed. 
John Haldane (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003).
 33. Cf. ST I. 85. 2. Also, In Ioannis, c. 1, lect. 1 (26).
 34. Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy, 74–75. Pasnau holds a different interpretation 
of this sense of verbum. “Before giving voice to one’s mental concepts one must formulate 
a kind of mental image of the utterance; one must mentally pick the very words one will 
use. This exemplar, this intermediary verbum, “is called the inner word that contains an 
image of the utterance,” “Aquinas on Thought’s Linguistic Nature,” 555–566. In a note he 
writes, “Aquinas has in mind here the De anima ’s claim that speech occurs “with some kind 
of imagination” (II 8, 420b32). (At ST 34.1c this connection is made explicit.) Evidently 
Aquinas does not understand Aristotle’s claim in such a way that the inner sense of phantasia 
or imagination is involved: the operation Aquinas describes seems to be wholly intellectual” 
ibid. n. 24. Pasnau’s interpretation is wrong. The context and examples given in DV 4. 1 and 
ST I. 34. 1 make it abundantly clear that Aquinas is referring to the inner sense of phantasia 
or imagination, and if there was any doubt it is unequivocally clear in, In Sent. I. d. 27. 2.1. 
Further, on Pasnau’s interpretation Aquinas’s conclusion in ST I. 34. 1, that only the word 
of the heart can be said of God in a non-metaphorical way, would not follow if “the opera-
tion Aquinas describes . . . [was] wholly intellectual.” I also suspect a homuncular fallacy lies 
hidden within his remark that, “one must mentally pick the very words one will use.” But 
perhaps he is innocently referring to the difficulty we sometimes have with selecting the best 
way to express a thought. Nevertheless, that is not what Aquinas is primarily referring to; 
though what he is referring to would be manifested in the latter phenomenon.
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 35. In PH I, lt. 2, 15 [5]. ST I. 13.1.
 36. In PH I, lt. 2, 14 [4].
 37. Technically, voice is not a faculty but a species of sound. Cf. In DA, II. 8, lt. 18.
 38. John Haldane develops this line of argument at length in his, “The Life of Signs.” 
He argues that speech-acts and various other kinds of linguistic terms only become semanti-
cally charged by the intentionality of mental states, and the latter, as Haldane shows, must 
be intrinsically intentional if we are to avoid an infinite regress. At the conclusion Haldane 
explains the reason how such mental states can be intrinsically meaningful. His answer fol-
lows closely Aquinas’s account of formal causality in ideogenesis, in particular SCG I. 53, 
which accounts for the isomorphism between thought and reality. I am assuming Haldane’s 
philosophical conclusions for the points being asserted here.
 39. Cf. In Sent. I. d. 27. 2.1. and ST I. 34.1.
 40. In Sent. I. d. 27. 2.1.
 41. Cf. ST I. 13. ad. 1. For a comparison of the word in Aquinas’s doctrine of God, 
angels and man see: Harm Goris, “The Angelic Doctor and Angelic Speech: The Develop-
ment of Thomas Aquinas’s Thought on How Angels Communicate,” Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 11 (2003): 87–105; “Theology and Theory of the Word in Aquinas: Understanding 
Augustine by Innovating Aristotle” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. Michael Dauphinais, 
Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2007), 62–78.
 42. Of course, there are a variety of other forms of communication, even linguistic, 
through visual, auditory, and tactile mediums (perhaps even gustation and olfaction?). For 
the sake of brevity, this paper will only discuss language and linguistic terms as written and 
spoken.
 43. It would require a work of its own to argue that language is actually hylomorphic, 
nevertheless I do believe there is some textual evidence that this is was Aquinas’s position. 
Cf. In Physics, I. lt. 1, n. 5 and In Physics, II. lt. 5, nn. 183–184; In Sensu I. lect. 1.
 44. Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy, 47. The citation for the quote is Edward Sapir, 
Language (New York: Harvest Books, 1949 [1921]), 8–9. French translation: Le langage 
(Paris: Payot, 1967), 12.
 45. Indeed, Aquinas makes this point explicit in the first chapter of his In Sensu, wherein 
he notes, following Aristotle, that we learn best through the hearing of sounds which can 
contain voice, i.e., significant intentions, and voice contains knowledge, nevertheless these 
intentions are themselves accidental to sound and hearing. In Sensu I.1.13–14.163–189. Also, 
In Sensu I.1.14.213–215. Also, In Sensu I.1.14–15.253–270, In Sensu I.1.15.273–303. Cf. 
In Meta I.1.
 46. Cf. ST II-II.8.1.
 47. Cf. DV 8.3; SCG I. 3, n. 4; II. 37, n. 2; IV. 55, n. 6; ST I. 1.9; 12. 12; 17. 1.
 48. Cf. In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 2, a. 2c; In DA II. Lt. 13; and ST I. 17. 2.; 78. 3, ad 2.
 49. In DA II. lt. 13. 118, 418a7–418a10.
 50. A lot could be said concerning Aquinas’s doctrine of external and internal sense facul-
ties, but this would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Unfortunately this forces me 
to present Aquinas’s doctrine in a dogmatic fashion rather then defending it philosophically. 
Linguistic Apprehension as Incidental Sensation in Aquinas 195
See the following articles which represent a sample of some of the best articles on sensation in 
Aquinas. Yves Simon, “An Essay on Sensation” in Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Readings, 
ed. Roland Houde and Joseph P. Mullally (Chicago, Philadelphia, New York: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1960); Robert Henle, “The Basis of Philosophical Realism Re-Examined,” New 
Scholasticism 56.1 (1982): 1–29; Paul MacDonald, “Direct Realism and Aquinas’s Account 
of Sensory Cognition,” The Thomist 71 (2007): 348–378; Debrah Black, “Imagination and 
Estimation”; Michael Stock, “Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas.”
 51. ST I. 78.3 and In DA III. Lt. 1 n. 575: “the common sensibles are not sensed in-
directly by any particular sense at all, but are directly sensed by many senses. Therefore the 
common sensibles cannot be the proper object of any particular sense” (my translation).
 52. In DA II. 13, 120.164–170.
 53. In DA II. lt. 13, 120.175–121.181.
 54. The term intentiones was the Latin translation of Avicenna’s term ma‘ānī found in 
Avicenna’s De Anima, IV and in his Metaphysics of the Shifā’ (esp. I. 5, and V. 1). In Avicenna 
this notion is used with other terms like quiddity (māhīyah, quidditas) to help clarify thing 
(shay’, res) which is one of Avicenna’s three primordial metaphysical notions (cf. Metaphysics 
of the Shifā’ I. 5). Deborah Black writes, “What is emitted vocally signifies what is in the soul, 
and these are what are called impressions (ãthãran), whereas what is in the soul signifies the 
things, and these are what are called meanings, that is, the intentions of the soul.” See Black, 
“Imagination and Estimation”, n12 (my emphasis).
 55. See ST I. 78. 4. It is important to note that intention here should not be confused 
with either intentional being (esse intentionale) and immutation which includes all objects 
and operations of cognition (e.g., images, memories, intentions, intelligible species, concepts, 
etc. cf. ST I. 78. 3 and In DA II, lt. 24), or with “intentions” as that which is a willed end 
(cf. ST I-II q. 11. a. 1). There is an underlying analogical similarity but important distinc-
tions—like that between the cognitive and appetitive—must be kept in mind to keep all 
three meanings precise.
 56. For further references to the vis cogitativa see: In Sent III. d. 26.1.2; DV 1.11; 10.5; 
15.1 ad 9; SCG II. 60; 73; 76; 81.3; Quaestio Disputata de Anima, 13.
 57. In IV Sent. d. 50.1.1.ad3. For further references to the intellectus passivus: SCG. II. 
60 and 73; ST I. 79.2.ad.2; DQdA. 13; DSC. 9.
 58. For further references to the ratio particularis: In Sent II. d. 24.2.1 ad 3; IV d. 50.1.1 
ad 3; DV 2.6; 10.5; 14.1 ad 9; 15.1; SCG II. 60; In Nic. Ethic VI. lt. 7; lt. 9; In DA II. lt. 
16; ST I. 20.1 ad 1; 19.2 ad 2; 80.2 ad 3; I-II. 51.3.
 59. In DA II. 13, 120.170–174. In DA II. 13, 121.182–183. In DA II. 13, 121.191–
122.201.
 60. This qualification would entail that intentions and semantic values are related 
asymmetrically. Every semantic value, whether universal or particular, is an intention, but 
not every intention as such has a semantic value. There also are important distinctions to 
be made concerning nominal and real definitions, intellectual insight into the meaning of a 
word (i.e., meaning as use), which signify the quiddities of material things, and then intel-
lectual insight into quiddities.
 61. As we have seen, Aquinas does have theological reasons for restricting the prime 
sense of verbum to our inner intellectual conceptions. Aquinas argues that the primary sense 
of verbum should not be attributed to our external words, but to that which has signifies 
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essentially and is intrinsically meaningful, namely, the preeminent words of our mind. What 
Aquinas wants to preserve is the Trinitarian analogy which employs the verbum cordis be-
cause it is a universal, immaterial, non-circumstantial expression of intellectual insight. This 
sense of verbum cordis is not diminished by Aquinas’s analogical use of verbum to signify 
words spoken and imagined, and thus I see no reason why my suggestion to posit a verbum 
cogitativae should alter the Trinitarian analogy. There are commonalities between the word 
of the heart to the intention expressed by the cogitative, and these commonalities should be 
observed even when we are distinguishing them. The term verbum cogitativae aptly denotes 
what is distinctive of the cogitative’s involvement in linguistic apprehension and expression.
 62. In DA II. 13, 121.183–187. In other words, if the intellect forms a universal inten-
tion independent of any cognition of a sensible reality, this operation does not count as an 
incidental sensation. It only counts when the intention apprehended is cognized simulta-
neously with the sensation of some essential sensible. I might apprehend some particular 
intention like, “that is a puddle and I should walk around it,” without actually expressing 
this apprehension and judged reaction in any linguistic manner at all. Anscombe’s Inten-
tion is full of examples of this sort, which is not to confuse the fact that I am speaking of a 
cognitive intentions here, and she is treating appetitive intentions in her work.
